Price-setting behavior in the presence of social interactions by Soetevent, Adriaan R., & Schoonbeek, Lambert,
Price-Setting Behavior in the Presence of Social Interactions
Adriaan R. Soetevent and Lambert Schoonbeek∗
Abstract
We analyze the eﬀects of the presence of social groups on the price-
setting behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist that produces a
good with a positive (local) consumption externality. The partition of
society into groups does not unambigiously give the monopolist the op-
portunity to raise its price and increase its proﬁt. The eﬀects depend
on a non-trivial interplay between the strength of the consumption ex-
ternality and on the speciﬁc composition of the social groups.
Keywords: conformity; localexternalities; social interactions; monopoly
pricing
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of the presence of diﬀerent social groups in
society on price-setting behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing monopolistic ﬁrm.
We use social (sub)group as the encompassing term for both social classes
and social clusters. Social classes or subcultures are groups of individuals
who are close according to some measure of social distance, like e.g. income,
age or educational level, like for example yuppies or the population of stu-
dents. Social clusters — which may alternatively be called cliques or peer
groups — are groups of individuals with a high degree of personal interrela-
tonships, like for example children in the same class.1 Authors like Akerlof
have stressed the importance of social groups in individual decision making,
calling “the potential existence of (...) subgroups in the population with
their own norms and values (...) one of the most important consequences of
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1In the literature on networks, the clustering coeﬃcient measures how closely knit a
circle of friends is (Barab´ asi, 2002).
1social interaction theory.” (Akerlof, 1997, p. 1010.) Within a group, there
may be strong incentives to mimic the consumption behavior of the other
members. This may be caused by social reasons (conformity), technological
reasons (network eﬀects), or by reasons of information dissemination. To
give an example, consider a teenager thinking about buying a cell phone.
The utility he derives from owning a cell phone is likely to increase with the
relative number of members in his social subgroup that own a cell phone, for
mere reasons of communication or because his peers will possibly ostracize
him if he refuses to buy a cell phone.2 We refer to these positive consump-
tion externalities that are contingent on an individual’s subgroup as local
externalities. They have to be contrasted with the externalities that are
commonly studied in the network literature. These are of a global nature in
the sense that they work through the number of individuals in society as a
whole that owns the good. The observed correspondence between network
models and social interaction models3 holds as long as society is considered
as one large social group, but changes character when society is partitioned
into diﬀerent groups.
Since local externalities are dependent on the social groups within so-
ciety, changes in the composition of these groups can lead to changes in
equilibrium pricing decisions. In this paper, we develop a simple, two-stage
model with a proﬁt-maximizing monopolistic ﬁrm4 to analyze a market with
local consumption externalities. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm sets a (uniform)
price for its good and in the second stage, consumers decide whether or
not they buy this good. Due to the consumption externality, the purchase
decision of a consumer is postively dependent on the fraction of consumers
in his or her group who buy the good. We analyze the consequences of the
presence of diﬀerent social groups by comparing a benchmark case without
diﬀerent subgroups with the situation in which society is partitioned into
two non-overlapping social groups. The price set by the monopolist and
its proﬁt are dependent on the strength of the consumption externality and
on the speciﬁc groups that are formed. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the
presence of diﬀerent groups does not automatically increase the proﬁt of the
monopolist. For some conﬁgurations, it lowers the price and incurs a loss as
compared to the benchmark case.
In practice, changes to social groups can occur exogenously, as a result
2Ormerod (1998, p. 23) describes how the dissemination of information aﬀects con-
sumption decisions within social groups: “If a friend or neighbour buys a VHS machine
and is satisﬁed, you are more likely to do the same.”
3For example, Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001) note with respect to the externality caused
by network goods: “Though the reasons for this externality are technological rather than
social, the corresponding models lead to reduced forms that can be used to study the
market impact of the social phenomena described above.”
4For simplicity, we focus on the monopolistic case, but the main message — proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms should react to the presence of diﬀerent social groups in society — is
equally valid in other market environments.
2of societal or policy changes.5 For example, the tendency to decrease class
size can be viewed as a development toward smaller social groups, at least
when one takes the position that a pupil’s class is a good proxy for his social
group.6 In this paper, we focus on these exogenous changes in social groups.
Clearly, the monopolist may (besides changing its price) also react to
the presence of diﬀerent groups by means of advertising campaigns that are
aimed at inﬂuencing an individual’s perception of the fraction of members in
his or her group that buy the product. A real-life example is the Vodafone
‘How are you?’-campaign. To teenagers, Vodafone tries to point out that
a large fraction of other teenagers in their subgroup own a cell phone by
depicting young people having fun at a pop concert. In the same commercial,
the company conveys a similar message to business men, by showing people
gathered in an oﬃce for an important meeting. However, the monopolist’s
advertisement decisions are not explicitly modeled in our current model.
In studies on network eﬀects, the existence of a positive consumption
externality gives rise to the analysis of compatibility decisions — should
ﬁrms opt for manufacturing compatible or incompatible products (Farrell
and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Ellison and Fudenberg, 2000);
should they choose whether or not to oﬀer an adapter to make their products
compatible (Baake and Boom, 2001) — and to the issue whether producers
should engage in introductory pricing to attract a critical mass of consumers
(Cabral, Salant and Woroch, 1999). We want to stress that one cannot sim-
ply interpret the partition of society into smaller social groups as some kind
of ‘reversed compatibility’. When compatibility is made undone, the abso-
lute number of people in an individual’s network unambiguously decreases.
However, in our model, the key determinant is the fraction of individuals
within your group that owns and uses the good. This fraction may as well
go up as down due to the partition. Furthermore, in our model the sepa-
ration between groups is not determined by product heterogeneity but by
exogenous individual characteristics.
In the next section, the model is introduced. In Section 3, equilibrium
demand, price and proﬁt are derived for a society without diﬀerent social
groups, and in Section 4, the same is done for a society segmented into two
non-overlapping social groups. Section 5 investigates under which condi-
tions the presence of the two groups increases or decreases the monopolist’s
5Deliberate changes in social groups by self-selection of individuals, an issue that
plagues empirical studies on social interactions, is modeled in another branch of liter-
ature (see e.g. Evans, Oates and Schwab, 1992) and is not considered in this paper.
6The reason for this decrease is the impression that pupils in small classes have an
advantage over pupils in larger classes in reading and math, and is as such exogenous to
our analysis. The ﬁnding is e.g. stated by Jeremy Finn and C.M. Achilles in the Amer-
ican Educational Research Journal (Fall 1990) when they refer to the Student/Teacher
Achievement Ratio (STAR) project: “This research leaves no doubt that small classes
have an advantage over larger classes in reading and math in early primary grades.” (see
cited URL-address.)
3equilibrium proﬁt. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a market on which a monopolistic ﬁrm supplies one good to a
continuum of consumers with mass equal to 1. This continuum is segmented
into J ≥ 1 social groups. The market is modelled as a two-stage game. In
stage 1 the monopolist determines the price p of the good. We assume that
the ﬁrm is not able to charge diﬀerent prices to the diﬀerent groups. Given
p, the consumers determine their demand for the good in stage 2. We will
derive the equilibrium of this model using backward induction.
Every consumer buys either one unit of the good or none at all. Within
a subgroup, consumers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic utility for the
product, but homogeneous with respect to the consumption externality. The
utility of a consumer in group j, j ∈{ 1,2,...,J},i sg i v e nb y :
U(φ,λj,p)=

φ + γλj − p if the consumer buys the product;
0o t h e r w i s e .
(1)
Here φ denotes the intrinsic utility of the consumer for the product, with
φ uniformly distributed on the interval [0, ˆ φ]. Without loss of generality
we take ˆ φ = 1. Social groups are formed by partitioning the population
according to the intrinsic utility φ. λj is the fraction of consumers in social
group j that buys the product, with j ∈{ 1,2,...,J}. The parameter γ>0
incorporates the strength of the bandwagon eﬀect.7 We assume that the
bandwagon eﬀect is equally pervasive in all groups, γ is the same for all
groups.
It is important to note that λj represents the fraction of the agents in
subgroup j consuming the good, not the absolute size of the local social
network: other things equal, this means that the consumption externality
is stronger if 2 out of 3 peers consume the good (λj ≈ 0.67), than if 4 out
of 10 peers consume the good (λj =0 .40), even though the absolute size of
the local social network is larger in the latter instance. For example, in our
mobile phone example it is easy to imagine that a consumer has a larger
propensity to buy a mobile phone when he can use it to communicate with 2
out of his 3 peers than when only 4 of his 10 peers can be reached by means
of mobile phone.
In stage 2, consumers maximize their utility, taking as given the decisions
of all other consumers. We assume that each consumer has perfect foresight
regarding the purchase decision of the other consumers. Further, the ﬁrm
7The bandwagon eﬀect was deﬁned by Leibenstein (1950) as ‘the extent to which the
demand for a commodity is increased due to the fact that others are also consuming the
same commodity.’ Note that γ = 0 corresponds to the classical case where externalities
are absent.
4has perfect foresight with respect to consumers’ demand. The price that
the ﬁrm charges in stage 1 is set so that proﬁts are maximized. To ease the
exposition, the marginal costs of the ﬁrm are normalized to be zero. Thus,
the ﬁrm’s decision process is
max
p
π = D(p)p, (2)
where D(p) denotes the total (equilibrium) demand for the good in stage 2.
Before entering upon the consequences of the presence of diﬀerent sub-
groups, we will ﬁrst analyze the outcomes when society is not segmented,
that is J = 1. This analysis will serve as a benchmark for the results ob-
tained in subsequent sections.
3 The unsegmented society
We assume from now on that γ<1; that is, for the consumer with the
highest valuation the eﬀect of the consumption externality is always smaller
than his intrinsic utility for the good. For larger values of γ, the bandwagon
eﬀect predominates, which results in rather trivial equilibria in which every-
one buys the good.
3.1 Consumer’s demand
In general, there are in stage 2 three possible (Nash) equilibria when the
total population is not split into subgroups: one where none of the consumers
buys; one where a fraction of consumers buys; and one where all consumers
buy the good. In equilibria where only a fraction of consumers buys, they
must group according to their type, since ∂U(·)/∂φ > 0. For this reason,
we deﬁne λ =( 1− ¯ φ), where ¯ φ denotes the intrinsic utility of the marginal
consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying or not buying (note that, for
notational simplicity, we delete the subindex of λ in this one-group case).
Solving the indiﬀerence condition for this marginal consumer, we obtain:
¯ φ + γ(1 − ¯ φ) − p =0 ⇒ ¯ φ =

p − γ
1 − γ

. (3)
The consumers that buy the good are those with φ ∈ [¯ φ,1]. We assume that
the marginal consumer purchases the good as well. Equation (3) shows that
¯ φ ≤ 1 ⇔ p ≤ 1a n d0≤ ¯ φ ⇔ p ≥ γ, and the following property is obtained:
Property 1 In stage 2 equilibrium demand D(p) is:
(i) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p)=1 ;
(ii) If γ ≤ p ≤ 1 ⇒ D(p)=1− ¯ φ =

1−p
1−γ

;
5(iii) If p ≥ 1 ⇒ D(p)=0 .
Thus, demand is complete (the mass of consumers who buy the good is
equal to zero) if the price is relatively small, demand is zero if the price is
relatively large, and demand is incomplete (the mass of consumers who buy
the good is between zero and unity) if the size of the price is in between.
3.2 Firm’s pricing decision
Turning to stage 1, we derive the pricing behavior of the monopolist, given
any γ. First, assume that (equilibrium) demand is D(p)=( 1− p)/(1 − γ).
It then easily follows that proﬁt is maximized if the price equals p0 = 1
2,
giving a proﬁt of π0 = π(p0)=1 /(4(1 − γ)). Note that demand only takes
on this form when γ ≤ p ≤ 1. Verifying this condition when p0 = 1
2 leads to
the restriction that γ ≤ 1
2.I fγ ≥ 1
2, all consumers want to buy the product
as long as p ≤ γ, leading to the optimal price p0 = γ with corresponding
proﬁt π0 = π(p0)=γ. The results are summarized below.
Property 2 The proﬁt-maximizing equilibrium price p0 and corresponding
proﬁt π0 = π(p0) are:
(i) If 0 <γ≤ 1
2 ⇒ p0 = 1
2; π0 = 1
4(1−γ);
(ii) If 1
2 ≤ γ<1 ⇒ p0 = γ; π0 = γ.
The result shows that when the conformity eﬀect is relatively weak (γ<1
2),
the equilibrium price is unaﬀected by γ, but proﬁt increases in γ, due to the
fact that the demand increases if the bandwagon eﬀect becomes stronger.
When the propensity to conform is suﬃciently strong (γ ≥ 1
2), the monopo-
list will always capture the entire market in equilibrium. In that case, proﬁt
increases in γ, since the optimal price increases if the bandwagon becomes
stronger.
64 A society with subgroups
In this section, the consequences of social groups on equilibrium demand,
price and proﬁt are analyzed. For simplicity we focus on the case with
two social groups (J = 2). The segmentation is implemented by splitting
the original population into two groups according to the intrinsic utility of
the consumers. Consumers with the lower intrinsic utility φ ∈ [0,φ s)a r e
assigned to group 1 and consumers with the higher intrinsic utility φ ∈ [φs,1]
are assigned to group 2. We assume that φs is exogenously given, with
0 <φ s < 1.
One can interpret the segmentation process literally as sorting individ-
uals according to their intrinsic utility. In diﬀerentiating between youth
and business men, Vodafone possibly indirectly distinguishes between two
groups with diﬀerent intrinsic utilities for mobile phones, as it might be that
the intrinsic utility that business men derive from a mobile phone is higher
or lower than the intrinsic utility youth derives from the same product.
One can also interpret the segmentation based on φ as a segmentation
on basis of income. This can be seen as follows. Suppose, for the moment,
that a population of consumers have identical ordinal preferences, and diﬀer
only in their incomes. Consider the additive separable utility function
U = s + u(I − p), (4)
where I is the income of the consumer, s is the utility associated with the
good under consideration, and u(I − p) the utility associated with all other
goods. We assume that u(·) is strictly concave. If p is small relative to I,
then the ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion shows that
U = s − u (I)p, (5)
which implies that the utility function is formally equivalent with
U = θs− p, (6)
with θ ≡ 1/u (I). (See also Tirole, 1988, p. 97.) When income is high,
marginal utility of income is low and the value of θ is large. This corre-
sponds with a large value of φ in (1), when the externality eﬀect in this
equation is neglected. With reference to the examples, it is plausible that
a segmentation into youth and business men also entails a segmentation on
basis of income. With respect to schools, a segmentation of pupils, corre-
lated with the funds they can draw on, occurs when richer families have a
tendency to send their children to private instead of public schools.
Notwithstanding these interpretations, the treatment of the presence of
diﬀerent subgroups is, admittedly, somewhat stylized, but it allows us to
derive tractable analytical results below for values of φs over the whole
range (0,1).
74.1 Consumer’s demand
The utility of the consumers in group 1 and 2 is still described by (1), with
j = 1 and 2, respectively. The demand function for each of the groups is
derived in a similar fashion as the demand function for the total population
in the previous section. Again, in equilibria where only a fraction of the
consumers buys, they must group according to their type, such that λ1 =
(φs − ¯ φ1)/φs and λ2 =( 1 − ¯ φ2)/(1 − φs), where ¯ φ1 and ¯ φ2 denote the
intrinsic utility of the marginal consumers in group 1 and 2, respectively,
that are indiﬀerent between buying and not buying. Solving the indiﬀerence
conditions for these marginal consumers leads, respectively, to
¯ φ1 + γ

φs − ¯ φ1
φs

− p =0⇒ ¯ φ1 =

p − γ
φs − γ

φs, for γ<φ s, (7)
and
¯ φ2+γ

1 − ¯ φ2
1 − φs

−p =0⇒ ¯ φ2 =

(1 − φs)p − γ
1 − φs − γ

, for γ<1−φs.(8)
Using the expressions for ¯ φ1 and ¯ φ2, one can easily derive total equilibrium
demand D(p)=D1(p)+D2(p), whenever γ<min(φs,1 − φs).
Whenever γ ≥ min(φs,1−φs), multiple demand equilibria may arise for
some price intervals in both group 1 and group 2. For example, take the
situation with φs = γ and focus on group 1. We distinguish now three price
intervals. First, suppose that p<γ . Then there is no equilibrium in which
a fraction of the consumers buys the good. However, if all other consumers
of group 1 buy the good, then even the consumer in group 1 with the lowest
intrinsic utility (φ = 0) will buy the good (that is, 0 + γ · 1 − p>0). Thus,
there is an equilibrium in which all consumers of group 1 buy. Further,
there is no equilibrium in which no consumer of group 1 buys the good
(since φs +γ·0−p>0). Combining results, if p<γ , then there is a unique
equilibrium given by D1(p)=φs. Second, suppose that p = γ.U s i n g t h e
same kind of reasoning, it can be seen that now we have an equilibrium in
which all consumers buy the good as well as an equilibrium in which no
consumer buys the good. Even more, it can be veriﬁed that equilibrium
demand in group 1 can equal any number between 0 and φs.T h u s ,t h e r ei s
a continuum of equilibria in this case. Third, suppose that p>γ . Then, one
can show in a similar way that the unique equilibrium is given by D1(p)=0 .
Considering the continuum of equilibria for the case where p = γ,w e
remark that the equilibrium in which all consumers of group 1 buy the good
Pareto dominates all other ones. For this reason, we follow Shy (2001, p.
20) and say that the latter equilibria are characterized by a coordination
failure. From now on, we adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 1 There is no coordination failure in equilibrium demand for
the good.
8This assumption is commonly used to solve problems with multiple equilibria
(see e.g. Shy, 2001; Baake and Boom). On basis of this assumption, the
Pareto dominated equilibria are ruled out in favor of the equilibrium where
all consumers buy. Invoking the assumption in our example, we have that
D1(p)=φs if p = γ.
Proceeding, it is useful to introduce a partition of the (γ,φs)-space (with
0 <γ<1a n d0<φ s < 1) into the following four domains:
domain A: γ<min(φs,1 − φs);
domain B: 1 − φs ≤ γ<φ s; φs > 1
2;
domain C: φs ≤ γ<1 − φs; φs < 1
2;
domain D: γ ≥ max(φs,1 − φs).
See also Figure 1 (in which domain A is further divided into subdomains
A1 to A6, as discussed below). In domain A the conformity eﬀect is below
average, γ<1
2, while in domain D this eﬀect is above average. Products
for which a conformity eﬀect is especially important are situated in the
latter domain. In domain B the dividing line between groups is drawn for
a value of the intrinsic utility parameter that is above average, φs > 1
2.
This means that a small group 2 with a higher than average intrinsic utility
comes into existence. For example, the shift of children from (very) wealthy
families toward private schools is modelled best with parameter values in
this domain. In domain C on the contrary, the split takes places in the
lower part of the intrinsic utility range, resulting in a small group 1. In
this case, one can think of ﬁrms introducing a product to the main category
of quite interested potential buyers, while there is a small fraction of the
population that has scarcely interest in the good.
The following property can be derived in a straightforward way:8
Property 3 Imposing Assumption 1, in stage 2 total equilibrium demand
D(p) is described by:
domain A. For γ<min(φs,1 − φs):
(iA) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p)=1 ;
(iiA) If γ ≤ p ≤ φs ⇒ D(p)=1+

γ−p
φs−γ

φs;
(iiiA) If φs ≤ p ≤ φs + γ ⇒ D(p)=1− φs;
(ivA) If φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1 ⇒ D(p)=
(1−φs−p)+φsp
1−φs−γ ;
(vA) If 1 ≤ p ⇒ D(p)=0 .
domain B. For 1 − φs ≤ γ<φ s:
(iB) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p)=1 ;
8The proof is available upon request from the authors.
9(iiB) If γ ≤ p ≤ φs ⇒ D(p)=1+

γ−p
φs−γ

φs;
(iiiB) If φs ≤ p ≤ φs + γ ⇒ D(p)=1− φs;
(ivB) If φs + γ<p⇒ D(p)=0 .
domain C. For φs ≤ γ<1 − φs:
(iC) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p)=1 ;
(iiC) If γ<p≤ φs + γ ⇒ D(p)=1− φs;
(iiiC) If φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1 ⇒ D(p)=
(1−φs−p)+φsp
1−φs−γ ;
(ivC) If 1 <p⇒ D(p)=0 .
domain D. For γ ≥ max(φs,1 − φs):
(iD) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p)=1 ;
(iiD) If γ<p≤ φs + γ ⇒ D(p)=1− φs;
(iiiD) If φs + γ<p⇒ D(p)=0 .
Property 3 states equilibrium demand in stage 2 for all relevant price in-
tervals and all combinations of parameter values (γ,φs). Observe that only
the following ﬁve types of equilibrium demand may occur: (a) demand is
complete in both groups; (b) demand is incomplete in group 1 and complete
in group 2; (c) demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2; (d)
demand is zero in group 1 and incomplete in group 2; (e) demand is zero
in both groups. In particular, it is not possible that equilibrium demand is
incomplete in both groups.
4.2 The monopolist’s pricing decision
Now, we want to derive the pricing decision for the monopolistic ﬁrm, given
any γ and φs. To this purpose, a separated analysis is performed for each
of the four domains A till D. For example for domain A,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c e
is calculated in the following way. First, we calculate for all price intervals
(iA)u pt o( vA) mentioned in Property 3 the optimal price, say p∗
iA,...,p ∗
vA,
and corresponding proﬁts (π(p∗
iA),...,π(p∗
vA)) under the restriction that this
price indeed is in the given interval. Second, the expressions for the max-
imum proﬁts in the diﬀerent price intervals are compared with each other.
The price that globally maximizes proﬁt in domain A is obtained as:
p∗ =a r gm a x {π(p∗
iA),...,π(p∗
vA);γ,φs}, (9)
and the corresponding proﬁt is π∗ = π(p∗).
10Deferring derivations to the Appendix, we present here the optimal price
and corresponding proﬁt for each of the domains. Doing so, we ﬁrst intro-
duce two threshold values for γ:
γ =
φs(1 − 2φs)
1 − φs
and ¯ γ =
φs
φs +1
. (10)
Notice that γ < ¯ γ since φs > 0. It turns out that domain A must be divided
into the following six subdomains for which the proﬁt comparison is executed
separately: A1 = {(γ,φs) ∈ A|γ ≥ ¯ γ and γ>1
2 − φs},A 2 = {(γ,φs) ∈
A|γ ≥ ¯ γ and γ ≤ 1
2 − φs},A 3 = {(γ,φs) ∈ A|γ <γ<¯ γ and γ>1
2 −
φs},A 4 = {(γ,φs) ∈ A|γ <γ<¯ γ and γ ≤ 1
2 − φs},A 5 = {(γ,φs) ∈ A|γ ≤
γ and γ>1
2 − φs} and A6 = {(γ,φs) ∈ A|γ ≤ γ and γ ≤ 1
2 − φs}.T h e
division of domain A into the six subdomains is depicted in Figure 1. We
remark that on the curve d1 the equality γ = γ holds, on the curve d2 the
equality γ =¯ γ holds, on the straight line d3 we have γ = 1
2 − φs,a n do n
the straight line d4 we have γ =1− φs.( T h ec u r v e γ3 - γ4 in Figure 1 is
explained in Section 5.)
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
It further turns out that, depending on the values of γ and φs, in equilibrium
there are four possible expressions for the optimal price and corresponding
proﬁt. We introduce the following notation for these four combinations:
pI = 1
2; πI =
(1−φs)
4(1−φs−γ);
pII = φs + γ; πII =( 1− φs)(φ + γ);
pIII =
φs−γ(1−φ)
2φs ; πIII =
[φs−γ(1−φs)]2
4φs(φs−γ) ;
pIV = γ; πIV = γ.
(11)
Now we are able to present the following property.
Property 4 Imposing Assumption 1, the proﬁt-maximizing equilibrium price
p∗ and corresponding proﬁt π∗ = π(p∗) are described by:
11(a) For (γ,φs) ∈ A2,A 4,A 6 ⇒ p∗ = pI; π∗ = πI;
(b) For (γ,φs) ∈ A1,A 5 ⇒ p∗ = pII; π∗ = πII;
(c) For (γ,φs) ∈ A3 :
if φs ≤ 2
3 and γ ∈ [γ1,γ 2] ⇒ p∗ = pII; π∗ = πII;
if φs ≤ 2
3 and γ/ ∈ [γ1,γ 2] ⇒ p∗ = pIII; π∗ = πIII;
if φs > 2
3 ⇒ p∗ = pIII; π∗ = πIII;
(d) For (γ,φs) ∈ B:
if γ<¯ γ ⇒ p∗ = pIII; π∗ = πIII;
if γ ≥ ¯ γ ⇒ p∗ = pIV; π∗ = πIV;
(e) For (γ,φs) ∈ C:
if γ ≤ 1
2 − φs ⇒ p∗ = pI; π∗ = πI;
if γ>1
2 − φs ⇒ p∗ = pII; π∗ = πII;
(f) For (γ,φs) ∈ D ⇒ p∗ = pIV; π∗ = πIV.
Here ¯ γ is deﬁned in (10), pI,...,p IV and πI,...,πIV are deﬁned in (11),
and
γ1,2 =
φs
1+3 φs
±
2φ2
s

(1 − φs)(2 − 3φs)
(1 − φs)(1 + 3φs)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
In Figure 2 we depict the equilibrium fractions of buyers in both groups
for the four possible outcomes given in Property 4. In this ﬁgure λI
1 and λI
2
denote the fractions of consumers that buy in equilibrium in, respectively,
group 1 and group 2, in the area where the optimal proﬁt is given by πI.I n
a similar way, we deﬁne λII
1 and λII
2 , etcetera.
Note that the area where πI is maximal is in the lower left corner of
Figure 2, where both the bandwagon eﬀect γ is relatively small and the
value φs at which the original population is split is small. The latter implies
that group 1 is relatively small here, whereas group 2 is relatively large.
Figure 2 shows that below the line d3, only a fraction of the consumers in
group 2 (those with the higher intrinsic utility) buys and nobody in group
1. Intuitively, a higher γ helps the ﬁrm to win consumers for his product.
Since in the lower left corner, both the intrinsic utility of the consumers in
group 1 (and, thus, the size of this group) and the value of γ are low, it is
not proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to lower prices to induce individuals in group 1 to
buy. Moreover, the low value of γ also prohibits the ﬁrm from selling to all
members of group 2. At points at the line d3, all individuals in group 2 buy,
even the person with the lowest intrinsic utility φs. The message this line
contains is that it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to sell to the person with lowest
intrinsic utility φs in group 2, even as (starting from a point on d3)t h ev a l u e
of φs decreases, as long as this decrease is compensated by an accompanying
12increase in the bandwagon eﬀect γ. Notice that due to this increase in the
bandwagon eﬀect, the ﬁrm does not have to decrease prices to induce the
marginal group 2 member to buy (on d3 the equilibrium price always equals
1
2).
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
In the middle part of Figure 2, πII is optimal. The ﬁgure shows that
in this case the equilibrium price is such that the monopolist captures all
members of group 2 as customers and none of group 1: the segmentation of
the population into buyers and non-buyers coincides with the segmentation
into peer groups. Again, the low intrinsic utility of the potential buyers in
group 1 makes it unattractive for the ﬁrm to sell to them. However, the
value of γ is high enough to win all members of group 2 for the product. In
the next section, we discuss that in this area, given φs, a stronger bandwagon
eﬀect leads to strongly increased prices. However, once the border denoted
by d4 is crossed, it pays to decrease prices sharply in order to induce all
individuals in group 1 to buy the product too. On the line denoted by d4,
πII = πIV.
In the upper left corner of Figure 2, the value φs is relatively high,
which means that group 1 is relatively large and group 2 is relatively small.
Moreover, the bandwagon eﬀect is modest. In this area πIII is optimal, and
all members of group 2 as well as some individuals of group 1 (those with the
higher intrinsic utility) buy. In the next section we argue that the ﬁrm makes
some price concessions to induce consumers in group 1 to buy the product.
If we cross the curve denoted by γ1 and γ2 in upward direction, consumers in
group 1 with the highest values of the intrinsic utility parameter are starting
to buy the good. On curve d2 in Figure 2 all members of group 1 buy, even
the person with intrinsic utility equal to zero. If, starting from a point on
d2,t h es i z eo fφs increases, then the price will increase (see pIII). The
individual of group 1 with intrinsic utility equal to zero is just induced to
buy if this increase in price is compensated by an accompanying increase in
the bandwagon eﬀect γ.
Finally, in the (upper) right part of Figure 2, πIV is optimal. In this area
all individuals will buy in equilibrium. The reason is that in this case, the
size of the bandwagon eﬀect prevails over the individual intrinsic utilities.
5 Eﬀects of social subgroups on prices and proﬁts
Properties 2 and 4 provide the equilibrium price and proﬁt for the situation
with one or two social groups, respectively. We can now compare the equi-
librium prices and proﬁts that are obtained before and after the formation
of subgroups. Given the presence of a bandwagon eﬀect, it is natural to
think that splitting a population into smaller groups is beneﬁcial for the
13ﬁrm, since smaller groups increase the possibilities to use the bandwagon ef-
fect to its advantage. Property 5 shows that this is only partially true. The
property gives the exact combinations of γ and φs for which equilibrium
proﬁt is increased due to the presence of diﬀerent social groups.9
Property 5 Imposing Assumption 1, let π0 be the equilibrium proﬁt with
one social group and π∗ be the equilibrium proﬁt with two social groups. We
then have:
(a) For (γ,φs) ∈ A1,A 2,A 4,A 5,A 6 ⇒ π0 <π ∗;
(b) For (γ,φs) ∈ A3:
if φs ≤ 1
2 ⇒ π0 <π ∗;
if 1
2 <φ s ≤− 1
2 + 1
2
√
5 and γ ∈ (γ3,γ 4) ⇒ π0 <π ∗;
if 1
2 <φ s ≤− 1
2 + 1
2
√
5 and either γ = γ3 or γ = γ4 ⇒ π0 = π∗;
if 1
2 <φ s ≤− 1
2 + 1
2
√
5 and γ/ ∈ [γ3,γ 4] ⇒ π0 >π ∗;
if φs > −1
2 + 1
2
√
5 ⇒ π0 >π ∗;
(c) For (γ,φs) ∈ B:
if γ<1
2 ⇒ π0 >π ∗;
if γ ≥ 1
2 ⇒ π0 = π∗;
(d) For (γ,φs) ∈ C ⇒ π0 <π ∗;
(e) For (γ,φs) ∈ D ⇒ π0 = π∗.
Here
γ3,4 =
1 − φs
2
±
1
2

φs(1 − φ2
s − φs)
1 − φs
.
Using Property 5, Figure 3 shows the (γ,φs)-combinations for which in
equilibrium the proﬁt in the case with two groups is, respectively, larger
than, smaller than, or equal to the proﬁt in the case with one group. In the
lower left part of the ﬁgure proﬁt is highest with two groups, in the upper
left part proﬁt is highest with one group, and in the right part proﬁt is the
same under one and two groups. The latter parallels a result by Grilo, Shy
and Thisse (2001) who ﬁnd in the context of a spatial duopoly model that a
single ﬁrm is likely to capture the whole market when conformity is strong
enough.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
We have calculated numerically for diﬀerent combinations of γ and φs the
percentage change in the equilibrium price, proﬁt and demand if we compare
the case with two groups versus the benchmark case with one group. We
9The proof is available upon request from the authors.
14will not report all the details of our calculations here, but only make the
following three observations. First, when group 2 with the consumers with
a high intrinsic utility is relatively large (that is, φs is suﬃciently small), the
ﬁrm has the possibility to increase its proﬁt by a maximum of about 18%,
reached at point (γ,φs)=(1/3, 1/3). However, if group 2 is relatively small,
and the value of γ is smaller than 1/2, the monopolist’s proﬁt decreases,
with a maximal loss of about 8%, approximately when (γ,φs)=(0.3, 0.66).
Second, we have examined whether the changes in equilibrium proﬁt are
primarily caused by changes in prices or by changes in demand. It turns
out that in the lower left part of Figure 3 there is a strong increase in price.
Given a value of φs, prices increase sharply as the bandwagon eﬀect becomes
more pervasive, to a maximum increase of 100%. However, when the line d4
is crossed, prices fall again to the same values as in the case without peer
group segmentation. The reason is that then it is more proﬁtable to capture
the entire market instead of only group 2. In order to attract the group 1
consumers, the monopolist has to reduce prices.
Third, in the upper left corner of Figure 3, the price set by the monopolist
is lower in the case with two groups than in the case with one group (the
maximal reduction here is 23%). The reason is, that for values of γ and
φs in this area, both group 2 is relatively small and consumers in group 1
with the highest intrinsic utilities have relatively high values of φ.T h u s ,t h e
ﬁrm is eager to sell to at least some individuals in group 1. However, these
individuals are not motivated by the buyers with higher intrinsic utility who
now belong to group 2. A price reduction is needed to induce them to buy.
The modest increase in demand that results is not suﬃcient to prohibit
the monopolist from suﬀering a loss due to the presence of diﬀerent social
groups.
Finally, suppose for the moment that the monopolist has control over
φs, what would then be his best response BR(γ) to an exogenously given
value of γ? The answer is that BR(γ)=( 1− γ)/2, a function that runs
from point (0, 1/2) to (1, 0) in Figure 3 (not shown). All combinations of
(γ,BR(γ)) are in the area with λII
1 =0a n dλII
2 = 1 (see Figure 2). This
means that, when given the opportunity, the monopolist picks φs in such
a way that a perfect segmentation in buyers and non-buyers is obtained,
irrespective of the value of γ.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we explored the consequences of the presence of local consump-
tion externalities, due to social groups within society, for the price-setting
behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist. The partition of society into
small social groups does not inherently lead to increased market power of
the monopolist. The sign and size of the change in prices and proﬁts is
15dependent on both the strength of the conformity eﬀect and on the speciﬁc
social groups that are formed.
The formation of social groups is done on basis of the intrinsic tastes for
the good. Though this implementation has an interpretation as a segmenta-
tion on basis of income, it is somewhat stylized and for this reason should be
seen as a ﬁrst attempt to model the consequences of social groups on price
setting. In this study, we only consider the case with two groups. A natural
future extension of the model would be to consider the eﬀects of partitioning
society into partially overlapping groups. Another modiﬁcation would be to
explicitly model the advertising decisions of the monopolist. A third pos-
sible extension is to allow for ‘multiplicative preferences’ under which the
value that consumers attach to the local consumption externality is corre-
lated with their intrinsic value for the good (see Ellison and Fudenberg for
an example of this).
16A p p e n d i x :P r o o fo fP r o p e r t y4
Since the analysis is rather extensive, we describe here the details for domain
A only.10 Recall that in domain A,w eh a v eγ<min(φs,1 − φs). First, we
consider the pricing behavior for each of the price intervals (iA)t o( vA)
indicated in Property 3. For notational simplicity, we speak below about
the intervals (i)t o( v); that is, we omit the ‘A’.
(i) p ≤ γ When the price is smaller than or equal to γ,d e m a n di s
complete in both groups and the optimal price the monopolist can choose
without leaving the price interval is choosing the price equal to the upper
bound of this interval. That is, p∗
i = γ and π∗
i = π(p∗
i)=D(p∗
i)p∗
i = γ.
(ii) γ ≤ p ≤ φs With demand given in Property 3, the following ﬁrst-
order condition for proﬁt maximization can be derived:
1+

γ − p
φs − γ

φs −

φs
φs − γ

p =0 .
Solving for p leads to the following expression for the corresponding price:
pii =
φs − γ(1 − φs)
2φs
,
which is decreasing in γ since φs < 1. Checking whether this price obeys
the condition γ ≤ p ≤ φs results in:
pii ≤ φs ⇔ γ ≥
φs(1 − 2φs)
1 − φs
≡ γ and pii ≥ γ ⇔ γ ≤
φs
φs +1
≡ ¯ γ
Remark that γ < ¯ γ as φs > 0. Hence, for this price interval, one has to
distinguish three cases with respect to the optimal price:
(iia)I fγ ≥ ¯ γ,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ei sp∗
iia = γ and π∗
iia = π(p∗
iia)=γ;
(iib)I f γ <γ<¯ γ,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ei sp∗
iib =
φs−γ(1−φs)
2φs and π∗
iib = π(p∗
iib)=
[φs−γ(1−φs)]2
4φs(φs−γ) ;
(iic)I f γ ≤ γ,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ei sp∗
iic = φs and π∗
iic = π(p∗
iic)=φs(1−φs).
Thus, when γ ≥ ¯ γ, demand is complete in both groups; when γ ≤ γ,
demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2, and when γ <γ<¯ γ,
demand is incomplete in group 1 and complete in group 2.
10The analysis for domains B till D is similar, and available from the authors upon
request.
17(iii) φs ≤ p ≤ φs+γ When price is within this interval, demand is zero
in group 1 and complete in group 2. As in (i) the optimal decision for the
ﬁrm is to choose price equal to the upper bound of the price interval, which
is φs+γ in this case. Thus, p∗
iii = φs+γ and π∗
iii = π(p∗
iii)=( φs+γ)(1−φs).
(iv) φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1 When price is within this interval, demand is zero
in group 1 and incomplete or complete in group 2. With demand given in
Property 3, solving the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization gives
piv = 1
2. This price satisﬁes the condition φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1 if and only if
γ ≤ 1
2 − φs. For this reason, one has to distinguish two cases:
(iva)I fγ ≤ 1
2 − φs,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ei sp∗
iva = 1
2 and π∗
iva = π(p∗
iva)=
(1−φs)
4(1−φs−γ).I nt h i sc a s e ,i fγ<1
2 − φs, demand is positive in group 2.
(ivb)I fγ>1
2 − φs,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ei sp∗
ivb = φs + γ and π∗
ivb = π(p∗
ivb)=
(1 − φs)(φs + γ). In this case, demand is complete in group 2.
(v) p ≥ 1 For prices larger than 1, demand is zero in both groups and
proﬁts are zero as well, π∗
v = π(p∗
v)=0 .
After this derivation of the optimal price and the corresponding proﬁt for
each of the ﬁve price intervals, the second step of the procedure is carried out.
In this step, the maximum proﬁts in the ﬁve price intervals are compared
given any combination of (γ,φs) within domain A. The price p∗ is chosen
that maximizes overall proﬁt π(p;γ,φs). Since for price interval (ii)a n d( iv)
there are three, respectively, two, subcases – dependent on whether γ exceeds
certain threshold values – domain A is divided into the six subdomains A1
to A6 introduced in section 4. For each of these subdomains maximum
proﬁts over the ﬁve diﬀerent price intervals are compared, given a particular
combination of (γ,φs). That price is deemed optimal that maximizes overall
proﬁts.
The relevant expressions of proﬁt that have to be compared for the dif-
ferent subdomains are:
For A1: π∗
i,π∗
iia,π∗
iii,π∗
ivb,π∗
v;
For A2: π∗
i,π∗
iia,π∗
iii,π∗
iva,π∗
v;
For A3: π∗
i,π∗
iib,π∗
iii,π∗
ivb,π∗
v;
For A4: π∗
i,π∗
iib,π∗
iii,π∗
iva,π∗
v;
For A5: π∗
i,π∗
iic,π∗
iii,π∗
ivb,π∗
v;
For A6: π∗
i,π∗
iic,π∗
iii,π∗
iva,π∗
v.
Observe that π∗
ivb = π∗
iii >π ∗
iia = π∗
i >π ∗
v =0a n dπ∗
ivb >π ∗
iic.
18• ad A1 From the above, it directly follows that for this subdomain
π∗
iii = π∗
ivb >π ∗
i = π∗
iia >π ∗
v.
Thus, the optimal price and proﬁt when (γ,φs) is in subdomain A1 are given
by p∗
A1 = p∗
ivb = φs + γ and π∗
A1 = π∗
ivb =( 1− φs)(φs + γ).
• ad A2 For A2 a similar evaluation gives
π∗
iii >π ∗
iia = π∗
i >π ∗
v,
such that only the expressions for π∗
iii and π∗
iva have to be compared. Note
that
π∗
iva ≥ π∗
iii ⇔ 1 ≥ 4(φs + γ)(1 − φs − γ),
which is satisﬁed since φs + γ ≤ 1
2 in subdomain A2.T h u s ,p∗
A2 = p∗
iva = 1
2
and π∗
A2 = π∗
iva =
(1−φs)
4(1−φs−γ).
• ad A3 As for A1,w ek n o w
π∗
iii = π∗
ivb >π ∗
i >π ∗
v.
What remains to be shown is for which (γ,φs)-combinations π∗
ivb maximizes
overall proﬁt and for which values (if any) π∗
iib. To this purpose, we solve
the equation π∗
iib = π∗
ivb,t h a ti s
π∗
iib = π∗
ivb
⇔ [φs − γ(1 − φs)]2 =4 φs(φs − γ)(1 − φs)(φs + γ)
⇔ φ2
s − 2γφs(1 − φs)+γ2(1 − φs)2 =4 φs(1 − φs)(φ2
s − γ2)
⇔ γ2(1 − φs)(1 − φs +4 φs) − 2γφs(1 − φs) − 4φ3
s(1 − φs)+φ2
s =0
⇔ γ2(1 − φs)(1 + 3φs) − 2γφs(1 − φs)+φ2
s − 4φ3
s(1 − φs)=0 .
Solving this equation for γ,w eo b t a i n
γ1,2 =
φs
1+3 φs
±
2φ2
s

(1 − φs)(2 − 3φs)
(1 − φs)(1 + 3φs)
. (A.1)
If φs ≤ 2
3, then the square root in (A.1) is nonnegative. If φs > 2
3, then this
root is imaginary, and π∗
iib ≥ π∗
ivb for all values of γ.T h u s :
• If φs > 2
3 ⇒ p∗
A3 = p∗
iib =
φs−γ(1−φs)
2φs and π∗
A3 = π∗
iib =
(φs−γ(1−φs))2
4φs(φs−γ) ;
• If φs ≤ 2
3 and γ ∈ [γ1,γ 2] ⇒ p∗
A3 = p∗
ivb = φs + γ and π∗
A3 =
π∗
ivb =( 1− φs)(φs + γ);
• If φs ≤ 2
3 and γ/ ∈ [γ1,γ 2] ⇒ p∗
A3 = p∗
iib and π∗
A3 = π∗
iib.
See Figure 1, where the roots γ1 and γ2 of (A.1) are depicted. The ﬁgure
shows that γ1 and γ2 are indeed relevant since they overlap with subdomain
A3.
19• ad A4 From the preceding, we know that
π∗
iva ≥ π∗
iii >π ∗
i >π ∗
v.
Thus, for (γ,φs)i nA4, the maximum proﬁt π∗
A4 is either π∗
iib or π∗
iva.S o l v i n g
π∗
iib = π∗
iva leads to
π∗
iib = π∗
iva
⇔ [φs − γ(1 − φs)]2(1 − φs − γ)=( 1− φs)φs(φs − γ)
⇔− γ3(1 − φs)2 + γ2(1 − φs)[2φs +( 1− φs)2]
+γφs[(1 − φs) − 2(1 − φs)2 − φs]=0 .
Solving for γ,o n eo b t a i n sγ =0o r
γ1 ,2  =
(1 − φs)(1 + φ2
s) ±
√
Discr
2(1 − φs)2 > 0, (A.2)
with Discr =( 1− φs)2[(1 + φ2
s)2 − 4φs(1 − 2φs(1 − φs))]. Notice that in
subdomain A4,w eh a v eDiscr < (1 − φs)2(1 + φ2
s)2 since 1− 2φs(1 − φs) >
1−(1−φs) > 0. The latter follows from the fact that φs < 1
2 in subdomain
A4.
However, one can show that for each value of φs, the smaller root γ1  in
(A.2) is larger than the corresponding value of ¯ γ. In other words, both lines
γ = γ1  and γ = γ2  are located at the right of line d2 in (γ,φs)-space.
Since π∗
iib <π ∗
iva when γ/ ∈ (γ1 ,γ 2 ), the result is that p∗
A4 = p∗
iva = 1
2
and π∗
A4 = π∗
iva =
(1−φs)
4(1−φs−γ).
• ad A5 Since both
π∗
ivb = π∗
iii >π ∗
iic and π∗
ivb >π ∗
i >π ∗
v,
we have that p∗
A5 = p∗
ivb = φs + γ and π∗
A5 = π∗
ivb =( 1− φs)(φs + γ).
• ad A6 In this case, we have
π∗
iii >π ∗
i >π ∗
v,π∗
iva ≥ π∗
iii and π∗
iii >π iic,
The fact that π∗
iva ≥ π∗
iii follows since φs + γ ≤ 1
2 in subdomain A6.I t
immediately follows that p∗
A6 = p∗
iva = 1
2 and π∗
A6 = π∗
iva =
(1−φs)
4(1−φs−γ).
Summarizing results, statements (a), (b) and (c) of Property 4 follow directly
by noting from (11) that pI = p∗
iva, πI = π∗
iva, pII = p∗
ivb, πII = π∗
ivb,
pIII = p∗
iib and πIII = π∗
iib.
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